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Why Does Crime Go Up When School Starts?

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Back-to-school is supposed to bring relief. Relief to parents who work and have to figure out child care in the summer. Relief to kids with bad home lives and those who rely on school for meals. And relief that kids will be supervised, no longer free to, say, shoplift or vandalize.

A widespread narrative that criminal behavior peaks in the summer months has long been thought to include criminal behavior by children. But new research indicates that children ages 10 to 17 are most likely to be involved in a reported crime right after they get back to school and right before they are let out for summer.

On today’s episode of Good on Paper, I talk with the economist Ezra Karger, who wrote a 2023 paper revealing that, unlike for adults, kids’ criminal activity doesn’t peak in the summer. Along with his co-author, Todd Jones, Karger reveals that when back-to-school time hits, kids are being arrested for behavior such as simple assault, drug crimes, and sexual assault—raising questions about whether school is creating the conditions for criminal behavior and victimization.

“So the conclusion we came to while digging into this paper is that taking a bunch of 10-to-17-year-olds and putting them in a large building—where they’re interacting with their friends, but also maybe people who aren’t their friends—that is leading them to be engaged in crime that is reported to law-enforcement agencies, and that is leading them to be arrested at higher rates,” Karger explains. “And we have a lot of analysis showing that this relationship is causal, that these patterns occur exactly when school is in session, that they don’t happen on weekends, that they don’t happen over the summer.”

The following is a transcript of the episode:

[Music]

Jerusalem Demsas: We’re used to thinking of the ways that school solves problems: It’s a place to learn. Schools provide lunch, access to teachers and staff who keep an eye out for signs of distress. And for kids with troubled home lives, school is an escape.

But over the past few years, there’s been a steady flow of new information complicating the uncomplicated idea that school is obviously good for kids. Alongside all these benefits are some pretty serious costs. For instance, there’s research showing suicides spike during the school year. And also, that some kids fared better during remote schooling.

This episode is about whether school can create problems, even as it solves others.

My name’s Jerusalem Demsas. I’m a staff writer here at The Atlantic. And this is Good on Paper, a policy show that questions what we really know about popular narratives.

[Music]

What time of year do you think kids commit the most crimes? I’ll give you a second to think. Summer? Winter?

Before I came across the research in today’s episode, I had a vague sense that kids, like adults, got up to the most trouble during the summer months. After all, they’re more likely to escape the supervision of adults when school is out. And whether it’s shoplifting at Sephora or tagging a highway underpass, it’s hard to find the time when you’re meant to be in school eight hours a day.

But I was wrong.

My guest today is Ezra Karger. He’s an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and, along with his co-author, economist Todd Jones, published new research that challenges a popular narrative about kids and crime.

It turns out that while for adults, summer is when criminal activity peaks, for kids 10 to 17, back to school—and right before school lets out for the summer—is when this age group is most likely to be involved in a reported crime.

Ezra helps me dig into the data, and we get into what exactly might be going on and the limitations of studies that look at reported crime.

All right. Ezra, welcome to the show.

Ezra Karger: Thank you for having me.

Demas: So we’re here to talk about a paper you recently put out, but before we get into that, I wanted to take a step back and ask you: What does it mean for crime to be seasonal?

Karger: Great question. I think when people think of the seasonality of crime, they focus on the fact that crime happens a lot during the summer and less during the winter. And there are a lot of opinions about why this might be happening: Maybe people are stuck inside when it’s cold out. Maybe people get really riled up when it’s hot out.

Criminologists are still debating why we see the seasonal patterns we see, but I think of the seasonality of crime in general as meaning: During the year, crime is higher at specific points than other times.

Demsas: There are a bunch of different theories. What is the theory that you find most compelling?

Karger: I find the temperature theory pretty compelling.

Demsas: Okay.

Karger: But on the other hand, you also sometimes see seasonal crime patterns in areas where there isn’t as much temperature variation. And so I don’t think that explains everything that’s going on, but I do think this high amount of crime during the summer is really interesting, and it’s probably deserving of additional research by economists and criminologists.

Demsas: And when we say, “the temperature,” are we literally saying, It makes people hotter, and hotter people are angrier?

Karger: That’s my lay interpretation of exactly what’s going on.

Demsas: (Laughs.) Okay. Yeah.

Karger: But I want to make sure I don’t step on criminologists’ toes. And I think they have many thousands of pages of papers about whether this might be what’s going on or not. But yes, I think that’s exactly what’s happening. I think people are outside more. People are getting more angry in the heat, and that just leads to more reported criminal offenses and more arrests.

Demsas: I know that—I mean, you just said right there—“more reported criminal offenses,” and I think that that’s going to be hanging over our entire conversation, but there’s a lot of concern with crime reporting, right? Because there are reasons why crime reporting might vary that has nothing to do with whether or not crimes themselves are increasing or decreasing.

There’s some research indicating that when there are prominent instances of police brutality, people may become more loathe to report to the police because they just say, Well, this is a corrupt institution. They might shoot someone if they come here. They may have fears around what that reporting looks like or if it’s valuable.

But also, you may not report crime, because the people committing it are people you care about. You don’t want them to go to jail. Maybe you don’t report your kid if they commit a crime—something like that. So how do you think about that when you’re doing this research? How do we control for those problems?

Karger: Yeah. There are many datasets that people use to track crime, and some involve relying on the law-enforcement agencies to tell us how many crimes there are and what type of crime is happening. And others rely on asking people if they’ve experienced specific crimes. And I think what’s really interesting in the paper that we’ll talk about soon is: We find the same patterns in both of those data sets.

And so when we think about whether you’re looking at the victimization side or the law-enforcement-agency reported side, I think if you’re finding patterns that match in both of those datasets, you can be more confident that we’re not just seeing something that relates to reporting bias.

And so there are several papers recently looking at how reporting of crimes varies over time and varies as a function of what else is going on politically or socially. And I think those papers are really important. And I think this is why having data on asking people whether they’ve experienced criminal behavior—either as the victims, as the offenders, as other members of this group that’s involved in crime—is really important.

Demsas: So before we get into your paper specifically, what do we know broadly about when kids commit crime? I had this general sense, alongside the kind of seasonality stuff you just talked about, that kids commit more crimes in the summer and also in those hours between when school lets out and their parents get home from work.

And I was trying to track down where this idea I had came from— I’m sure people were just saying this to me. It also seems like police officers will often talk about this. But there’s a 1996 paper that’s produced by the Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention that shows that on school days, juvenile violence peaks between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m., and they don’t see that similar pattern on nonschool days.

Looking closer, it appears that data is just from South Carolina. But it seems logical. What do you think about this?

Karger: Yeah. Coming into this question of when juveniles are involved in crime, I had exactly the same belief about what we would find. I thought there’d be more crime maybe after school, when school gets out, but before children are supervised. There’d maybe more crime during the summer when children might be hanging out more. They might be less supervised by their parents who are working. And I don’t think there was a consensus that I saw in the criminology literature and the economics literature about what patterns this would follow.

There are some papers in criminology looking at, you know, National Crime Victimization Survey or data on crime that said, Well, it looks like maybe we see different patterns of seasonality at a monthly level for children relative to adults when we think about when crime is happening and when crime is being reported.

But when I talked to people who hadn’t yet seen the results of our paper, they definitely thought, Yeah, when children are unsupervised, when they’re out and about during the summer—that’s when we’re going to see higher rates of crime involving children.

Demsas: Okay. Let’s turn to your paper. It’s called “School and Crime,” so we know exactly what we’re getting into. So you and your co-author confirm the sort of overall criminal activity peaking in the summer, but then you look closely at the 10-to-17 age group. What do you guys find?

Karger: Great. So we take this data from NIBRS, the National Incident-Based Reporting System, and we ask whether this pattern of seasonality involving crime is different for people of different ages. That was our first question coming in.

And so Todd Jones, my co-author, had this idea of just looking at the raw data and seeing if anything popped up. And we dug into the raw data, and what we saw is, for adults, there’s this clear summer peak of crime—reported crime, reported arrest rates—that’s higher in the summer for crime involving adults.

But for children, we really saw the opposite pattern. We saw that crime was at its lowest level—and rates of arrests were at their lowest level—over the summer. And then once September, October rolled around, we saw crime involving children peak as either victims or offenders. And then in the spring, right before school got out, we also saw really elevated levels of crime relative to the summer, right after school had ended.

And so that was really the entire paper—that one fact. And then the other 80 pages are trying to dig into all of the underlying data and figure out whether this is reflecting a causal relationship, whether we trust these results because of problems with the reporting bias and other things that might be going on with the data.

Demsas: Why would this be happening? Why is it that we don’t see that kind of difference? Obviously, it’s a difference with the 10-to-17 age group.

Karger: Yeah. So the conclusion we came to while digging into this paper is that taking a bunch of 10- to- 17-year-olds and putting them in a large building—where they’re interacting with their friends but also maybe people who aren’t their friends—that is leading them to be engaged in crime that is reported to law-enforcement agencies, and that is leading them to be arrested at higher rates.

And we have a lot of analysis showing that this relationship is causal, that these patterns occur exactly when school is in session, that they don’t happen on weekends, that they don’t happen over the summer.

We don’t have a lot of data, because of the source of our underlying data for this paper, on why this is happening. So one thing we’re pretty agnostic about in this paper is the mechanisms. We are not going to be able to say, Well, it’s because of how recess is structured, or, It’s because of how teachers interact with students and send them to the school police officer, if there is a school police officer in their school. We are not going to be able to say anything about that.

We are just pointing to this striking regularity in the data, which is that children are much more likely to be involved in crime during the school year, during the school day, and when they’re in school, specifically.

Demsas: And are these crimes happening at school, or do you know where these crimes are happening?

Karger: Yeah. One amazing thing about the NIBRS data is they have a measure of whether the crime is happening in school or not. And we do see that this pattern is almost entirely driven by crimes happening in school.

We also have data from New York City, which has very clear geographic markers, like longitude and latitude pairs, of where each crime is occurring. And in New York City, we also can see that the crime that we’re measuring here and the patterns we’re measuring here are really taking place within a very small radius around the school.

Demsas: What types of crimes are happening? What sorts of things are we mostly observing?

Karger: What I found pretty shocking about this paper is we find this relationship for most types of crime. So this is not just driven by drug crimes. It’s not just driven by assaults. It’s driven by a lot of crime types that we can measure in the data.

Maybe to point to specific types of crime where we see a very striking effect, we do see that drug crimes peak during the school year. We also see that simple assaults—when we say assault, I don’t want you to have the same idea, maybe, in your head about a typical assault involving a 30-year-old, right? This is an assault that’s reported to a law-enforcement agency, but if it involves a 10- or 11-year-old, it might be less of a severe assault than what we’re thinking about with adults. But we see that assaults—

Demsas: What do you mean? Just, like, shoving another kid would send you to jail?

Karger: That’s a good question. We are collecting data here from many law-enforcement agencies. If two kids shove each other, and it gets reported as an assault, that is in our data as an assault. If two kids shove each other, and then they get arrested, that’s reported as an arrest involving an assault. And I think that’s important because when you think about what goes on their record, that’s going to be an assault, whether it involved a knife or just shoving.

And so we’re relying on the law-enforcement agencies, as we do in society, to define what these crimes are, for the purposes of reporting, and to define what’s happening with arrests. We aren’t measuring convictions or incarcerations. That’s something that’s farther down in the carceral pipeline that we’re not going to look at in this paper. But I do want to take that into account, where we’re really relying on what people have experienced and what gets reported as our measures in this paper.

But we see this, really, across many types of crime. So weapons-related crime, even property damage shows a weaker but somewhat similar signal. We don’t see this pattern as much for theft. And so that might get to this idea that some types of crime don’t face the same seasonal patterns. Maybe it’s easier to steal things when you’re not in school.

Demsas: Yeah.

Karger: But we do see this pattern for sexual assault. There are some other crime types that are very serious, which, thankfully, we don’t have a lot of in our data. So we don’t measure these patterns clearly. Like, you know, murders or killings, we don’t see this pattern for. And it’s unclear whether that’s because we don’t have a lot of data on them because, thankfully, 10- to 17-year-olds aren’t engaged in a lot of those types of crimes. But also, it might still be in the data if we had more power.

Demsas: One thing I’ve heard from criminologists often is that in order to make sure you’re not having reporting problems, you want to track murder rates, mostly because it’s very unlikely you’re going to conceal a dead body. It’s harder to do that. People disappear. Their body gets discovered. You’re going to have a pretty accurate sense of murder, even if you may not have an accurate sense of property damage or things like that.

Are you concerned that, given that there’s not the spike in murder that you’re able to observe, that maybe it’s a reporting thing that’s happening rather than an actual shift in the crime rate?

Karger: Yeah. This was our main concern about this project. So Todd and I spent a lot of time working with the NIBRS data, and we were very confident that in the NIBRS data, we were seeing these patterns. And so the obvious question is reporting bias. Maybe what’s happening is that when kids are in school, more of the crime that is already occurring is being brought to the attention of law-enforcement agencies.

Before digging into how we can check whether this is true or not, I want to talk about whether that’s important. You might care a lot about whether crime is occurring, but you also might care about whether it’s leading to reported crimes and arrests because arrests are something that affect how kids interact with law-enforcement agencies, and they affect what’s going on your record, right? If that arrest is leading to other things, those dynamics can be really important for children. And so I want to start by saying, whether or not this is reporting bias, I think it’s really important.

But we did want to see if it was reporting bias. And so what we did is we dug into this National Crime Victimization Survey, and we asked whether people who are 10 to 17 years old were reporting being the victims of more crime in the months when school was in session, relative to the months when school was not in session.

Demsas: Okay.

Karger: And what we saw was that if you look at adults in the National Crime Victimization Survey, you see exactly the seasonal patterns we expected to see: Reported victimization rates peak during the summer. But if you look at children, at 10- to 17-year-olds, you see exactly the pattern we saw in NIBRS. You see reported crimes involving children, where we’re measuring this based on the victimization reports, peak during the school year.

And so that really convinced us that, while some of this effect might be driven by reporting bias, these patterns are not entirely reporting bias. There are clear increases in crimes that are occurring, according to the self-reported victimization surveys, during the school year, relative to the summer.

Demsas: Gotcha. I guess also, about victimization then, too, do you find that children in this age group are the ones who are the primary victims of these crimes? Are their victimization rates also increasing seasonally with the school year?

Or I guess it’s possible that they’re committing crimes against adults, right? You could be having that happen with teachers or support staff or other people in these schools. So what do you find about victimization rates?

Karger: Yeah. I was really interested in who was being reported as committing these crimes and who is reported being the victims of these crimes. And I think these crimes are, really, students affecting other students. There are also, let’s say, drug crimes where you don’t have a victim, per se. Those are considered victimless crimes, but you do see those also change.

But let’s focus on something like assaults. So we can measure in the NIBRS data whether these are occurring between friends, acquaintances, family members, romantic partners. The data is incredibly rich. And what we see is that the victims and offenders are often very close in age. They’re often exactly the same age. We see this pattern where kids who are exactly the same age are more likely to be in this sharp increase in crime—reported crime and arrests—relative to kids who are very different in age.

Like, 17-year-olds are not assaulting 10-year-olds. You usually have 13-year-olds assaulting 13-year-olds in this data or 14-year-olds assaulting 14-year-olds. And this is consistent with an idea about the mechanisms, where you’re interacting with students who are in your grade. You’re interacting with students who are in your elementary school or in your middle school or high school. You’re not interacting with kids who are very different from you in age, and you’re not, in this data, assaulting 40-year-olds who happened to be stopping by the school. This is really about kids who are in school together and in this large building with other people like themselves.

Demsas: One thing I wanted to go back to is what you said about how you expected to find this kind of seasonality. So why did you even look into the data, then, if you were not really expecting to find anything novel?

Karger: Yeah. There are a series of papers showing that the school year really matters for children’s outcomes. There’s a paper about cyberbullying showing that during COVID, searches for cyberbullying-related topics dropped. And we think that’s very correlated with actual experiences of cyberbullying.

There’s also a paper about suicides that I find very sad, which is that during the school year, suicide rates among children increase. And so one of the reasons that I came into this paper with a prior that I would see the common seasonal patterns, but I was also curious about how taking children and putting them in this system—which has them in a building, has them interacting in very specific ways—I was curious if that would have different effects on reported crime and arrest rates for different types of crime, different types of arrests. And I wasn’t a hundred percent confident that I would go in and see the high peak in the summer.

Demsas: One thing I thought about when I was reading this paper was: Is it that these crimes would not have happened if school was year-round, or is it like the kids are, like, saving up the crime that they would have committed over the summer and then just doing it all right when the school year happens, or the school year commences? Is it that there actually would be less crime if kids were just not in school at all, or it would all be normalized if kids were in school year-round, or is it actually creating more crime?

Karger: There’s this amazing paper by Brian Jacob and Lars Lefgren, which looks at teacher prep days. So these are days during the school year when school is randomly closed. And they use these days to look at effects of school being closed on property crime and violent crime. And then they also try to check for substitution effects. They look at exactly what you’re talking about. And they find very little evidence that crime is then substituted to days when those kids are not in school nearby.

Our analysis strategy is not as well set up for trying to measure substitution effects, because we’re really using the school year as this shock—this big thing that’s happening during the year—and it’s much harder to say what would happen in the absence of a school year or if school was all year-round. That’s a huge change to policy that we can’t really generalize to.

What I will say is: I don’t think this is substitution. At least, I don’t think most of this is substitution. That’s my personal belief based on the data we’re seeing. And the reason is: If you take what is going on with crime involving children during the summer or during after-school hours, and you try to predict how much crime would happen during the school year based on those numbers, you see predictions that are much lower than what we actually see.

And so I just don’t think that’s consistent with children who are, like, saving up crime during the summer and then waiting until they’re there over the school year. And I think it would be a strange model where in July someone decides not to assault someone so that they can assault someone in October.

Demsas: It could be that, you know, someone has really irritated you. And they’re online, for instance, and then you can’t actually see them. And then the first day of school, you jump them. Do you know what I mean?

Karger: Yes. Absolutely. That’s an interesting question, and I would say that my best evidence that that’s not happening is that the elevation of crime does not just happen for the first week or two. It really takes longer. And so if people were saving up those crimes, they’d have to be saving up those crimes and then spreading them out over the first few months of school, instead of just dealing with this problem for the first week. And that seems really strange.

Demsas: Just a bunch of devious teenagers trying to mess with your data.

Karger: Yeah, exactly.

[Music]

Demsas: All right. Time for a quick break. More with Ezra when we get back.

[Break]

Demsas: Just walk me through a little bit about how you actually were able to construct this paper, because schools obviously start at different times of year. You had to normalize all of that? That seems like a very difficult process.

Karger: Yeah. I would say we used three strategies to try to figure out whether this relationship was causal. The first—and this doesn’t work in many papers—is just looking at the raw data. And the raw data was striking enough to make it clear that the patterns we saw for the other 85 pages of the paper were going to hold up. What we saw is that if we looked at reported crime rates involving children, we had this incredible U shape, where they drop during the summer and then increase when the school year starts, and then they stay elevated, and then they drop again when the school year ends.

And we contrasted that with crime rates and arrest rates involving people who are slightly older, so 19- to 24-year-olds or 25- to 30-year-olds. And for those groups, we did not see a U shape. We saw the inverted U shape—the hump of crime peaking during the summer. But then there’s the question of how we can actually estimate these effects causally using methods that economists often use.

And what we did is: We scraped information from a website that gathered school calendars that had exactly when the school district was starting school and ending school. And then we did line up all the school districts. So we had this very complicated process that Todd designed where we linked the school districts to law-enforcement agencies. And it’s not obvious how to do that, because law-enforcement agencies and school districts don’t cover the same area. So we threw out places that didn’t really link up well. We relied on the school districts that did line up well.

And then we said, If we take all of the school years that we have—some of them are starting right after Labor Day; some of them are starting in August. My school in the Northeast always started in September after Labor Day. Our 3-year-old just started school in D.C. It turns out D.C. schools start in mid-August. And so using that variation, we can line up all the schools and see whether crime is peaking the week or two after school starts, relative to the week or two before. And we can, in a regressions-continuity design, try to control for various characteristics of the school district or the law-enforcement agency.

The results are striking enough that we don’t really even need to do that. When you line everything up, you see stark differences between the amount of reported crime and arrest rates, especially at the end of school—so in the week or two following the end of school—relative to the week or two before when you line up all these districts. And you also see those patterns at the beginning of the school year.

Demsas: Obviously, some schools, as you said, start earlier in the summer. Do you see any differences between schools that are starting school in August versus starting school later in September? If we’re talking about your hot thesis, you would expect there to be more crime in those places?

Karger: Yeah. We haven’t dug into that yet. And it’s something I’m really curious about. I want to dig into temperature, maybe try to control for that, compare schools that started earlier or later. One thing that we haven’t talked about yet that is very important is that, thankfully, crimes involving children are not that common. And that means that trying to estimate these effects and splitting the sample up into different pieces or looking at groups of schools that were starting in September or August—that actually isn’t that well powered, because we don’t have that many crimes involving juveniles in our data.

So that makes analysis hard in some sense, but it’s also, I think, a good fact to remember. So we’re talking about big changes in reported crimes and arrest rates involving children, but those are coming from very small baselines. I think about 2,000 arrests of 10- to 17-year-olds per 100,000 people is roughly the rate we were seeing in the data in 2019 nationally. And so that’s a lot of arrests, but when we start to split up the school districts into different subgroups, it becomes much harder to measure these effects, especially when we’re focusing on comparing one week to the week before.

Demsas: So there’s obviously a lot of concern—especially in certain school paradigms—with sending kids to the cops or even reporting kids to the police, in general. Were you able to look at other sorts of reports of student behavior, whether it’s suspensions or anything that indicates that this kid has behaved in a way that might technically qualify for a criminal offense, but they just don’t want to report that kid? Were you able to look at those?

Karger: Yeah. So we were not. I would love to have underlying data on suspensions or expulsions, behavior that might lead to arrests or reported crime that we could then use as a baseline. What happens there is more of a data problem where the schools are collecting that data during the school year, but we specifically want to compare that data to what’s happening during the summer.

And there are no institutions that are collecting reports of misbehavior about students over the summer. That’s maybe one of the main mechanisms driving the results. And so because of that, we don’t have baseline data on that type of question to compare things to. So there are measures of school-district-level suspensions by age. I have another paper looking at suspensions of kindergarten through second graders in North Carolina, where we have very detailed information during the school year of what behavior kids were engaging with that was causing them to be suspended—but that data doesn’t exist over the summer, and it certainly doesn’t exist nationally.

Law-enforcement agencies are this patchwork across the United States who independently report data to some collective bodies, but even the NIBRS data that we use is only covering, during the years we’re using it, about half of the U.S. population. So just getting all of this data on reported crime and arrests accumulated has taken various government agencies decades. And I think it would be great to have data on suspensions. We don’t have that yet, especially nationally.

Demsas: Yeah. I think one of the secret things that people who don’t work on studies don’t realize is how much of it is just attempting to get good datasets. And the best people in economics are the ones who are just lucky or have done the work or able to build the relationships to get that data as soon as possible.

So then, just moving a little bit further than your paper, there’s a lot of research indicating that year-round school would be really, really good for students, that there’s a huge learning loss that happens over the summers, that a lot of students don’t get access to free school lunch or counseling, or they’re locked at home if you’re in an abusive household. There are lots of reasons why it’s better, on average, for students to be in school year-round. If kids were in school year-round, do you think crime rates go up?

Karger: Yeah. That’s a good question. As a parent, I’m very in favor of year-round school because summer sounds like a terrible thing to try to address, logistically. But let’s think about whether it would affect crime rates. So one of the things we try to do in this paper is describe the facts we see in the data. We have no clear policy implications of this paper. This is not a paper that’s saying we should abolish all schools. This is not a paper that’s saying we should extend schools year-round.

There’s other literature looking at what would happen if you extended the school day or if you extended the school year or if you changed when school started and made it start later. I think looking at criminal activity reported or arrests in those papers would be really interesting. My personal belief is that you might, based on our results, see higher rates of crime involving children if you extended school year-round. But I want to be very clear that that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do it, because, as I said, crime involving children is rare.

I think it’s an important outcome, but it’s not something that people should focus on and only base policies off of. One of the responses we’ve gotten to this paper is people saying, Well, this is evidence that schools are kind of problematic. Maybe we should abolish them or have all of our kids stay home and homeschool them. We are not saying that, right? I think that’s like saying, You have hospitals. You have antibiotic-resistant MRSA for a few people every year. Therefore we should abolish hospitals.

There are other benefits to school. There are other benefits to hospitals. Lots of institutions have many effects, some positive and some negative.

We’re trying to have a puzzle piece there that’s saying this is another negative outcome you should think about when you’re thinking about the benefits and costs of school. And we think policy makers should focus on schools as a key driver of crime involving children and arrests involving children, which we believe is really important. But I would be really wary about extending this to clear policy implications about year-round school.

Demsas: I also want to ask how this interacts with other research that shows that education reduces crime, in the aggregate. You cite in your paper a 2022 paper by Brian Bell and his co-authors. Can you talk about what they find and how you think that then would interact with the aggregate crime rates? Because even if it’s increasing in schools, perhaps, overall, people being in schools means that you have less crime overall.

Karger: Yes. So there’s a large literature looking at school-dropout laws, compulsory-schooling laws, when children are required to attend school, and how many years they’re required to attend school for. And what that literature finds some evidence of is that forcing people to stay in school for longer reduces crime rates, reduces crime rates for the cohorts who were forced to attend school for longer. And so it’s an interesting contrast to our paper. We’re finding, in aggregate—or we’re arguing that, in aggregate—schools are increasing crime involving children and arrests involving children.

And those papers are finding that forcing children to stay in school longer is reducing crime rates. And so this gets to a really important topic when you’re evaluating an economics paper or any applied work that uses causal inference. The papers looking at school-dropout laws are measuring a local average treatment effect on the students who were caused to stay in school by the law.

And so it’s quite possible that the students who stayed in school longer because of these laws that required that they stay in school longer are very positively affected by those laws. Maybe that’s 2 percent of the population, and maybe that 2 percent of the population is half as likely to be involved in crime as they were beforehand. That’s very different from saying that, in aggregate, 100 percent of the children in school are seeing a 30 or 40 percent increase in the crime involving children in school and the arrest rate involving children in school.

And so I think what often happens when you have these papers looking at the causal effects of policies is: They’ll find some effect, directionally, that people then latch on to, and people will then say, Well, based on the fact that this policy has this positive or negative effect on an outcome we care about, we should do it everywhere, or we should do it nowhere.

And economists who think about general equilibrium effects often push against this because they say, Well, those papers, while really important, are focusing on the effect on a specific population at a specific time. And before extending a policy based on the results across the population, you should think about what that will do to the entire population. And that’s not something that these papers can necessarily talk directly about. And so I don’t think that that literature conflicts with our findings here.

I think what it’s saying is really important. It’s saying that, conditional on the setup of school we have in the United States, forcing kids to stay in school longer is having this positive effect on the kids who respond to that policy. And what we’re saying is: The way that school works is it pulls children into a large building, and it causes them to interact in a way that leads to higher levels of reported crime and higher arrest rates. And those two things are both true.

Demsas: If this podcast can make more people think in general equilibrium, I will have done my job. So you’ve referenced a couple of these earlier in your comments, but we tend to think of being in school as being good for kids, but it’s clear there are really heterogeneous impacts, depending on what that kid’s position is, what’s going on with them.

You mentioned the suicide literature. But also, I think the thing that’s been most jarring for me in recent years is learning about the remote-schooling literature and how different it was for different kids. Former guest of the show Chris Campos and his co-authors have a recent paper. They’re building on work that shows decreases in bullying during the remote-school-learning era. And they find decreases in both online and in-person bullying during remote schooling and that parents who were reporting that bullying were more likely to be demanding their remote learning.

So how do you think policy makers should react to the diversity of experiences here? Because, on average, it’s clear, their research shows that being in school has significant benefits, right? The negative average effect of remote learning is clear on reading and in math, but for the kids who are being bullied, it’s actually positive. They’re now doing much better. But often with schools, you’re making kind of blanket policies here. So how should someone think about this? Because obviously if you’re able to target these sorts of solutions at the specific kids you’re most worried about, that could lead to better outcomes.

Karger: Definitely. So we do look at how our effects vary by male and female students or black and white students. And we find very similar percent increases in reported crime and arrest rates involving those children of different types. And I was surprised by that. I expected to see differences. We also tried to figure out if county-level characteristics of a place predicted whether we would see larger or smaller percent increases in crime and reported crime and arrest rates involving children.

And we didn’t really see much of a difference. We didn’t see that there were strong predictors, whether it was poverty rates or income rates or rurality versus urbanity in these places and whether that predicted the outcomes of interest. And so I don’t think our paper gives you a clear population to focus on when it comes to trying to target a specific group that’s maybe more at risk of these increases in reported crime rates, in percent terms.

But there is a question of percent and percentage points. And we do have groups that start off at different baseline levels of reported crime rates and baseline levels of arrest rates. And so you might think—and policy makers focus on this—that some groups are more likely to be involved in crime more generally, that some groups are more likely to be arrested. And you might want to focus policies about how students interact with the criminal-justice system on those students.

But I think your point about the remote-work literature gets back to the general equilibrium effect. I know some parents who were very happy that their kids were not in school, because their kids were not enjoying school. I also know a bunch of parents who got no work done for a year because they were trying to supervise 5- year-olds who were engaged in remote schooling. And so just like we have to deal with those general equilibrium effects when thinking about what policies should or shouldn’t be implemented in school, I think that same comment and type of question applies to the remote schooling-literature.

There’s this question of, Well, does this mean we should give everyone the option to go to school remotely? We don’t know. We just have this one huge shock of COVID, and we can see how it affects people’s experiences when they were in remote school. And I think Chris’s work or other people’s work says, on average, this is not great. For some students, it was good.

Demsas: Yeah. I think one of the more difficult parts of policy making is that you often do have to decide things in averages, and that means that often some people would be better off on a different policy. But you can’t actually make policy for 330 million people very differently, because whether someone else goes to school actually also impacts how your kid does in school. Like, if for some reason, which we’re seeing, you see higher-income parents pulling their kids out of school, that has general effects on the rest of the population. I know you’re resisting the urge to continue to tell us what to do on policy, but I’m going to keep asking you anyway.

I was curious about curfews because, somehow, I feel like this research kind of does interact with the research literature on curfews as well. Every summer, I hear of dozens of cities implementing curfews, and I was looking at D.C.’s, which I did not realize was extremely strict, but we have a year-round curfew. For children under 17, you’re not allowed to be outside at night. During the summer, that curfew is midnight. During the school year, it’s 11 p.m. And I found this paper by Jillian Carr and Jennifer Doleac, who is a listener of this show. So hi, Jennifer. They have a paper about juvenile curfews and urban gun violence, and they find that curfews are actually counterproductive.

They’re looking at the D.C. curfew, and, as I said, during the summer, it’s midnight; in the school year, it’s 11 p.m. So they look at that 11 p.m. hour when school gets back into session. They find that gunfire is increasing by 150 percent during that marginal hour.

So this kind of interacts with what you’re talking about here around how we think about keeping kids monitored or inside or somewhere at school or at home or wherever as being better for crime rates. But here it seems to be a substitution effect that is happening here. I don’t know what you think is going on in that space.

Karger: Yeah. So I think that’s really interesting. It gets back to exactly what we were talking about with compliers and the school-dropout laws. So a curfew can’t really affect the trends we’re showing in this paper, because a curfew won’t affect the children who are actually in school during the day, right?

So which type of children does a curfew affect? A curfew affects children who are thinking about whether to be outside between 11 p.m. to midnight, in the case that you’re talking about. So what we’re saying in our paper is that a significant fraction of the crime involving children happens during the school day, during the school year. That’s a separate policy question. I think it’s unrelated to the curfew question.

But if we try to think about curfews, there’s a series of papers, including the one you mentioned, showing that curfews can have this counterintuitive effect or maybe can have some positive effects—I’ve seen a few papers, I think, of each type. And what should we learn from that? Well, we can maybe learn whether we should implement more curfews on the margin or not.

But we also know from the results from our paper and other work that that won’t have a huge effect on total crime involving children. That’s a very small fraction of the crime involving children. And so when you talk about a 150 percent increase, the baseline level there is small, relative to the total number of reported crimes and arrests involving children.

Demsas: For me, my big takeaway from this is: First, the number of crimes that are involving children are so low that this should not be, potentially, the variable we’re most interested in when we’re thinking about whether or not kids should be in school at different times of the day.

And it also reminds me: I wrote an article recently about the impact of remote schooling on parents, and there was a paper that came out recently, and they found that there was an increased antidepressant use by mothers and increased alcohol use in school districts or in counties where schools were shut down longer.

And it makes me think about how much education policy is—we often talk about it explicitly as being for the kids, but often the unspoken thing is that it’s really also about everyone else. It’s also about parents. And then, of course, it’s generally the broader question of: What crimes are we mostly concerned about? Are we that concerned about the drug deals happening in schools? Are we that concerned about, maybe, a scuffle that happens in the hallway? Or when we think about crime involving juveniles, is it the property crime that we’re mostly concerned about? Are we upset about shoplifting that’s happening outside of it. And making that policy feels, often, not really focused on the individual well-being of those students.

But this has been a great conversation, Ezra. Thank you for coming on the show. I learned before the show that you were a super forecaster, which means that our last question will, I think, be really good for you. So what is something that you thought was good on paper but didn’t pan out in the end?

Karger: Yeah. I was trying to think about forecasting, but maybe I’ll mention something that relates to our conversation about policy and causal policy effects. So I’ve worked on several projects where we can’t really find the data we would need to estimate effects that I believe are really important. And so just to mention two of those, I started this project with a co-author about ambulance systems, emergency-medical systems, trying to figure out what the rollout of those across the United States did to health.

And it turns out that the law that helped implement some standardized national EMS systems also was the one that started to collect the data that you would need to evaluate whether those systems had any effect. And so we ended up in this very annoying place where there was no pre-policy data to compare to. So we couldn’t really measure whether these policies had any effect.

Similarly, I was working on this project trying to figure out if poison-control centers did anything. So, What effect does having access to poison-control centers do to rates of poisonings involving children? which are very common. Kids will drink bleach or other things by mistake because it’s in a little cabinet. And it turns out that when the standardization of poison-control systems happened, that also tended to be exactly when people started to collect data on how many times kids were reported as having been involved in various accidental poisonings.

And so as it relates to this paper, I would say we could only work on this project because of this incredible data that exists about reported crime and arrest rates that people have spent decades trying to put together. And there are all of these policies that seem really important that economists and social scientists can’t really dig into because we don’t have the outcome data we need to measure whether the policy had any effect. And so that’s something I think about a lot when I’m starting these projects, and I end up getting very frustrated that we don’t have, from the 1950s or ’60s, the data we would need to measure these effects that we care about.

Demsas: This is actually a very funny “good on paper” because it’s also, like, the forgotten bin of ideas that were attempted and poured heart and soul and tears into, and then at the end of the day, you can’t do anything with it.

Karger: It’s great to finally get to mention them.

Demsas: Yeah. Well, thank you so much for coming on the show.

Karger: Thank you for having me.

[Music]

Demsas: Good on Paper is produced by Jinae West. It was edited by Dave Shaw, fact-checked by Ena Alvarado, and engineered by Erica Huang. Our theme music is composed by Rob Smierciak. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic audio, and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.

And hey, if you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts.

I’m Jerusalem Demsas, and we’ll see you next week.


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Working long hours at a law firm is no guarantee of affording a mortgage, much less in the historic Central Los Angeles, where Joan was a proud homeowner.How to Die Alone wrestles with what it even means to try when opportunities for career advancement come few and far between—and how Mel’s professional woes color her relationships with her family, her closest friend, and the ex she regrets leaving. Mel wasn’t born into wealth, but her mother and older brother seem comfortably middle-class, and they’re baffled by Mel resigning herself to a life of five-figure debt. Their frustrations with her don’t come solely from a place of judgment—like most families, they just can’t afford to cover Mel’s expenses indefinitely. Whatever grace they may have extended to her in the past seems to have expired as she edged further into her 30s, a decade when a woman floundering in her love life seems to draw as much condescension as one struggling with work does. The message is clear: Mel needs to get serious—now.Without spoiling too much, there’s an unlikely shift in their dynamic late in the season—but not because Mel gets a fancy new job. Thankfully, How to Die Alone doesn’t present a management-training program as her ticket to happiness, or even to self-actualization. Instead, the series spends considerable time exploring the unexpected sources of support around Mel, and nudging her to invest in the people who have always seen more in her. Although Mel still finds herself landing in some trouble later on, it’s clear that she’ll benefit from having let those people get closer—even if it means they’re witnessing her messiness up close. The chaos might not be fully resolved, but she finally grows up when she accepts that there’s no virtue in navigating it on her own.
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Addressing them as “comrades,” he pronounces that his mandate and theirs, as writers, is “doing their part to save the world.” Then come three essays built around racially or ethnically charged travel. The last and by far the longest piece is devoted to his single transformative visit to Israel. It is the book’s main reason for being, and it is a condemnation of the “elevation of complexity over justice,” which is “parcel of the effort to forge a story of Palestine told solely by the colonizer.” Coates’s dismissal of complication amplifies the certainty of the book’s title, which, given the biblical landscape of the book’s second half, appears to allude to the fierce truth-telling of the prophets. Coates seems almost to put himself on that plane.Yet an undercurrent of shame, in multiple forms, lies beneath his conviction: shame, partly, over having internalized the worldview of oppressors. 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But to absorb the rest of the essay, to reread and reread it, is to sense that his rendering of his experience inside Yad Vashem is strategic as well as sincere, a means of inoculating himself against charges of insensitivity or worse as he becomes purely polemical and takes up, without any complication, the Palestinian anti-colonial narrative. The row of soldiers at Yad Vashem is, in Coates’s mind, safeguarding nothing less than the evil of the Jewish state, an evil barely obscured by the “moral badge of the Holocaust,” by Israel’s self-congratulatory creation story of rising from victimization to strength and self-determination in “a God-given home.”Traveling in the West Bank, he observes that Palestinians collect rainwater in cisterns while Jewish country clubs fill their swimming pools with bountiful state-supplied water. In a Jewish settlement outside Hebron, he walks into a park named in honor of Meir Kahane, a Zionist extremist whose disciple, Baruch Goldstein, in 1994, slaughtered 29 Muslims worshiping at the Tomb of the Patriarchs, an ancient site venerated by both Muslims and Jews. Coates discusses the West Bank roads that Palestinians are forbidden to drive on, the checkpoints they’re subjected to, the state-perpetrated or state-permitted violence that stalks them constantly, the mass displacements that saturate their history. The list of injustices is long—and it is harrowing, though nearly every detail Coates offers may be familiar to anyone who has studied the conflict reasonably well. Jolting, too, if unsurprising in historical context, are the quotations Coates marshals to demonstrate that leading Zionists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries thought and wrote in ruthlessly colonialist and racist terms.[Adam Kirsch: The false narrative of settler colonialism]Beneath the essay’s unremitting argument runs a set of powerful and convergent emotional forces, among them the shame and guilt Coates declared nearly a year ago and reiterates in The Message. Yet his sense of culpability is at once more precise and more sprawling than “How could I not know?” It involves a crime that he accuses himself of committing in the pages of this magazine—and which, he announced at the November event, he would be “making amends for until the day they put me in the ground.”In his 2014 Atlantic article calling on the United States to pay reparations for the ongoing effects of slavery and state-sponsored discrimination, Coates turned to the history of the young Jewish state and the reparations it received from Germany as an example of how beneficial such payments can be. He now vehemently repudiates that part of the article for its obliviousness to the oppression wrapped up in Israel’s birth and existence. “My words here,” he writes in the book’s Israel essay, are a personal “bid for reparation.”Within the failure Coates sees in the magazine article that launched him toward fame lie strata not only of guilt but also, it seems, of searing anger. Thinking back to when he wrote it, he remembers himself as a journalist all too willing to tread tactically and tactfully at the “hallowed and lauded” and white-led publication that gave him a platform, and all too ready to conform to what he believes is the governing Israel-friendly outlook of the mostly white media world. For Coates, it is a world infused by white supremacy and by a mindset that, even if only half-consciously, views Israel as an outpost of Western white hegemony. He recalls his feelings as a racial outsider advancing a marginalized argument about the need for U.S. reparations: “You are ultimately in their world and are thus compelled to speak to them through their symbols and stories.” The story of Israel provided the perfect exemplar, a way to couch an outsider’s argument in an insider’s language. Now, he writes, he knows better about what Israel represents, but back then he was insecure, unquestioning, accepting. “I felt my deep ignorance of the world beyond America’s borders and, with that, a deep shame.”Though Coates’s Israel essay dominates the book, the other pieces are essential to fully understanding his motivations, as well as his willful blind spots, while he is there. The book’s second essay, about a trip to Dakar, Senegal, painfully evokes an acute sense of internalized inferiority: “The weight of my first trip to Africa—the many years it took me to actually go—is directly tied to … men like Josiah Nott, a nineteenth-century anthropologist, epidemiologist, and student of civilization. Nott was also a slaveholder” who called his anthropological specialty “Niggerology.” He deemed himself “the big gun of the profession,” a profession that, according to Coates, “had but one aim—assembling all the knowledge Nott could summon to prove we were inferior and thus fit for enslavement.”Coates’s candor is riveting. The long legacy of such racist anthropology made him reluctant to visit Africa. When he finally did, he found himself looking through a white-supremacist lens. In one of the best passages in the book, he recounts taking a taxi from the airport into Dakar on a beachside road. “All along that beach I saw what looked like the abandoned remnants of an outdoor training gym,” he writes, “and in the blur of our passing I saw yellow paint peeling from the machines to reveal the rusting metal beneath. I assumed that these pieces were the remains of some public works project gone wrong, and the sight of this ostensible failure immediately became a sign of our collective dysfunction, of the ‘Negro race’s’ irredeemably savage state. And hearing that voice in my mind, I came to a terrible realization.” It is that despite the Afrocentric lessons he learned from his parents, and despite the Afrocentric name they gave him, “I was still afraid that the Niggerologists were right about us.”Dakar starts to liberate him from this predatory fear. He buys “the most beautiful fabric I’d ever seen.” He is transfixed by the physical beauty of the people, which leaves him “amazed—too amazed, I think,” betraying “a deep insecurity, a shock that the deepest and blackest part of us is really beautiful.” But the liberation is fleeting. One night at dinner with a Senegalese writer and his wife, he hears about the widespread practice of skin-bleaching in Senegal. “The valuing of light skin was obviously not new to me as a Black American, but to encounter the idea here”—among “my lost siblings”—“was chilling.”The next morning, he takes a short ferry ride to the Gorée Island memorial, with its Door of No Return, long believed to be a point of embarkation for the Middle Passage. He is keenly aware that the importance of this place in the slave trade is likely more myth than history, that probably very few enslaved people passed through this port, that the idea of its being “any kind of origin point for Black America” is “imagined and dreamed up to fill an emptiness of a people told that they come from nothing and thus have done nothing and thus are nothing.”Despite the feelings of flimsiness and futility that surround the memorial, Gorée moves Coates to tears. Then, in a deft pivot, the memorial stirs thoughts of his father reading a book about a failed slave revolt in Guyana that ended with rebel leaders “collaborating with the very people who enslaved them.” The book leaves his father lamenting, “‘I don’t think we are ever going to get back to Africa.’ My father did not mean this physically. He meant the Africa of our imagination, that glorious Eden we conjured up as exiles.”[Read: Letter to my son]Sadly, such layered introspection is rare across Coates’s travels. Too often, his method isn’t nearly as subtle or searching, and this, combined with a reflexive self-involvement, tends to rob The Message of truly resonant insight in both Senegal and Israel.On the last night of Coates’s brief Dakar trip, the Senegalese writer and his wife assemble a group for him to meet over tea. “They were my kind of people—activists against the corruption of the state, writers delving into rising homophobia. But they were something more. We are, Black people, here and there, victims of the West.” Yet his writing bears no evidence that he engaged with anyone in the room. He seems to have solicited no one’s thoughts about anything that had plagued him during his visit. He doesn’t seem interested in their perspectives. Instead, the essay takes a bizarre turn in its final paragraph. Coates describes, among the guests, a young woman, a local university student, who is writing a dissertation about his work. He highlights her “look of amazement” at being in the presence of Ta-Nehisi Coates. Rather than seeking out and including the ideas of any of his fellow guests, he chooses to end by remarking on the potency and reach of his own words.In Israel, the seal Coates creates around his own mind becomes impermeable. He refuses to countenance conversations with Jews who don’t share his opinions and don’t denounce their nation. He has “the right” to “shove bullshit,” he asserts, “out of the frame.” (In contrast to the depths of reflection inspired by the Gorée memorial, Yad Vashem becomes, in the book’s last pages, a monstrosity, because it was built not far from the site of a massacre of Palestinians during the warfare leading up to Israel’s declaration of independence.) Meanwhile, every Palestinian he spends time with is accompanied by an air of utter innocence. Early in the book, Coates praises writing that illuminates “common humanity,” but in his Israel essay, this ideal gives way to a strict dichotomy between perpetrators and victims.The more relentless Coates becomes in his prosecution of Israel, the more he loses his way. His habitual unwillingness just to recognize conflicting perspectives and evidence, even if only to subject them to counterarguments, undermines his case. Might it have been worth noting that Israel is surrounded by Arab states and populations committed to its annihilation? That to a great degree, Palestinian leadership as well as many Palestinian people share this eliminationist view, which might help explain the forbidden roads and onerous checkpoints? That Baruch Goldstein’s unforgivable mass murder came on the heels of others, by Muslims of Jews, near the same sacred tomb? That, some would argue, the Palestinians have rejected two-state proposals running back to the late 1930s, when the British put forth a plan that would have granted the Jewish people only about 20 percent of the land that is now controlled by Israel?Coates races right past such points. Although many of his sentences have a measured cadence, there’s something manic about his approach. He seems driven by what’s most animated in his own head and heart: the shame and persistent pain and insidious inferiority inflicted by “the long shadow of slavery.”With all of this at play internally, Coates goes beyond allying himself with the Palestinian cause. He identifies entirely with it. He and the Palestinians share the suffering of “conquered peoples.” It is almost as if he feels that through his embattled attachment and identification, he can free his own psyche from “the long shadow.” And this personal urgency may elucidate Coates’s staggering omission. His essay, in a book published near the one-year mark of Hamas’s October 7 attack, contains nothing about that day and nothing about the war since. Not a sentence, not a word. The word Hamas does not even appear.Why leave this out? Wouldn’t Coates have wanted to argue that Israel’s bombing campaign has amounted to genocide or ethnic cleansing? Wouldn’t he have wished to conclude his case in this way? Probably, but in doing so he would have been compelled to at least note Hamas’s murders, rapes, dismemberments, and kidnappings of civilians, even if only in the swiftest summary, and this would have marred the purity of the essay.Purity of argument is Coates’s desire; complexity, his self-declared enemy. In this, in his refusal to wrestle with conflicting realities, the essay feels desperate. It feels devoid of the layers and depths of the most profound moral writing, devoid of the universalist goal, the exploration of “common humanity” that Coates has extolled. Complexity, not purity, is the essence of the moral and the humane.
theatlantic.com
What Will Mitt Romney Do if Trump Wins?
On a swampy afternoon this past spring, I met Mitt Romney in his soon-to-be-vacated Senate office. It was strange to see him in person again. For two years, we’d talked almost every week as I worked on a biography that would cement his reputation as a Republican apostate. Since the book’s publication last year, we’d kept in sporadic touch—mostly through texts, the senator’s preferred medium for venting about politics—but we hadn’t spoken in much depth.Some things hadn’t changed. Romney was, as ever, acutely attuned to his own mortality. “I saw an article this morning saying that they find your chances of getting Alzheimer’s are significantly increased based upon two things,” he told me as soon as we sat down. One factor was alcohol consumption; the other was stress at work. The latter had him worried. Romney is a teetotaler but has been addicted his whole life to stressful jobs. “I mean, I’ve felt high stress in my work since—” He thought about it. “Well, since I went to grad school.” He’s stepping down when his term ends in January. Retirement, he told me, would be good for his health.[Read: ]What Mitt Romney saw in the SenateAs we chatted, though, I noted a change in his countenance. In the past, his frustration—with the Senate, with the Republican Party, with politics in general—had always seemed tinged with resignation. Maybe he was miserable, but he felt obligated to stay in Washington and do his part. Now, at 77, he couldn’t wait to leave. He seemed lighter in a way, but also more restless. Mormon missionaries have a term for the feeling of distraction and homesickness that sometimes settles in as they approach the end of their service: trunky. I asked if the term applied to him now, and he smirked: “Oh yeah.” This essay was adapted from the new afterword for the paperback edition of Romney: A Reckoning. Romney had mentioned to me repeatedly, in those brief exchanges over the preceding months, that life in Congress was getting worse. He wasn’t alone in feeling this way. His planned departure was part of an unusually large wave of retirements from Congress in 2024—52 as of May—and the phenomenon had prompted much discussion about why lawmakers were rushing for the exits. “It is the worst year of the nine years and three months that I’ve been in Congress,” Ken Buck, an outgoing Republican congressman from Colorado, told CNN. “And having talked to former members, it’s the worst year in 40, 50 years to be in Congress.”When I asked Romney why his colleagues seemed so miserable, he surprised me by launching into an uninterrupted, seven-minute diatribe about everything that was wrong with Washington. He talked about growing polarization, and the radicalizing effects of the primary process, and the institutional dysfunction of the House, and the indignity of serving in Congress during a presidential-election year.To illustrate this last point, he offered an example. Last year, a bipartisan group of lawmakers had negotiated a bill aimed at restricting illegal immigration. It had been written at the behest of Republicans, who said they would fund new Ukrainian military aid only if Congress also tackled the “crisis” at America’s southern border. Then Trump came out against the immigration bill, having reportedly decided that the crisis at the border was good for his reelection prospects, and Republicans promptly fell in line. To Romney, it was clear that the priority for most of his colleagues was “to do whatever their nominee wants”—not to solve the problems they’d been elected to solve: “If Donald Trump says, ‘Hey, kill that immigration deal,’ [they’re] gonna kill the immigration deal.”Romney told me he’d been invited to deliver a commencement speech, and he planned to illustrate the cynical nature of politics today by talking about his childhood fascination with professional wrestling. As a kid, he’d been enthralled by the theatrical rivalry between “Dick the Bruiser,” a muscle-bound former NFL player, and “Haystacks Calhoun,” a 600-pound farm boy from Texas. The two men riled up crowds by thumping their chests and talking trash about each other. “I was intrigued,” Romney told me, “until my brother, six years older, said it’s all fake. And it suddenly became less interesting.” Congress, he’d come to discover, was more or less the same. “Most of what’s going on in these buildings is just fake”—less policy making than performative animosity and posturing.I thought it sounded a little bleak for a commencement address, but Romney wasn’t soliciting feedback. Before I could say anything, he was venting about the lack of seriousness in legislative debates over the federal debt and climate change, and the plague of partisan “messaging bills” that are written to score points instead of make law. Finally, when he’d tired himself out, he slumped back in his chair. “We’ve got some real challenges,” Romney said, “and we just don’t deal with them.”“So that’s—anyway, that’s a long answer,” he said with a sigh.I joked that it seemed like he had a lot to get off his chest. He didn’t laugh.It was not lost on me that the publication of my book, Romney: A Reckoning, was a more fraught experience for Romney than it was for me. As a biographer, I’d looked at his stories about the dissolution of the GOP under Trump as a valuable contribution to the historical record. But Romney had paid a price for his candor.To the extent that there had been any doubt before, the book sealed his status as a villain in MAGA world. Conservative publications ran takedowns with headlines such as “Mitt Romney, We Hardly Knew Ye.” Sean Hannity, a onetime cheerleader for Romney’s presidential campaign, denounced him as a “small, angry, and very bitter man.” Trump himself weighed in with a characteristically rambling post on Truth Social in which he seemed to confuse the biography for a memoir. “Mitt Romney, a total loser that only a mother could love,” the review began, “just wrote a book which is, much like him, horrible, boring, and totally predictable.”Romney was mostly amused by Trump’s reaction (“Hahaha!” he texted me at the time. “He’s such a whack job!”), but the book’s chilly reception among Republicans on Capitol Hill must have been upsetting. Some of his colleagues made known their disapproval in private. Others, including Senator J. D. Vance, lashed out in the press. “If he has a problem with me,” Vance told a reporter, “I kind of wish he just acted like a man and spoke to me directly, not whining to a reporter about it.” Romney wasn’t exactly surprised by the attacks from people he’d criticized in such withering fashion. (“I don’t know that I can disrespect someone more than J. D. Vance,” he had told me.) Still, the hostility was unpleasant enough that, after The Atlantic published an excerpt from the book, he opted to skip the GOP caucus lunch.The Trump-era GOP’s perception of Romney as a devious traitor put him in a precarious position. The 2024 presidential election had, by that point in the spring, played out exactly as he’d predicted. Trump had easily defeated a large and feckless field of Republican challengers to clinch the party’s nomination, despite facing 88 criminal charges. And Joe Biden looked to be on a glide path to renomination, despite having some of the worst approval ratings of any modern first-term president. In the months that followed, the race would become more volatile—a disastrous debate performance by Biden; a party-wide panic and push to replace him on the ticket; the nomination of Kamala Harris; the assassination attempts on Trump. But that spring, polls showed Trump clinging to a persistent lead, and Romney was convinced that a second Trump term was imminent.Romney had made this prediction before, telling anyone who would listen in the run-up to the 2020 election that he thought Trump was going to get a second term. He’d even bet one of his sons his prized 1985 BMW that Biden would lose. But back then, he’d told me, it was a kind of psychological game he played with himself—predicting the outcome he most dreaded as a form of “inoculation.”This time felt different. Trump had repeatedly pledged to use the Justice Department and the FBI to go after his political enemies if reelected. “I am your retribution,” he enjoyed telling his crowds. Romney knew that he was likely to appear on any enemies list kept by the former president, and he’d privately mused to friends that it might be time for him and his wife, Ann, to consider moving abroad. (A spokesperson for the senator told me he was not serious about this.)But when I asked Romney, in the spring, what a Trump reelection would mean for him and his family, he was careful at first. “I don’t know the answer to that,” he said. If Trump tried to sic the Justice Department on him, Romney told me, “the good news is I haven’t had an affair with anybody; I don’t have any classified documents; I can’t imagine something I’ve done that would justify an investigation, let alone an indictment.”What about his sons? I asked. Might they be targeted?“I mean, hopefully they’ve all crossed their t’s and dotted their i’s,” Romney replied, straining to sound casual. “But it’s hard for me to imagine that President Trump would take the time to go out and see if [he] can find something on members of my family.”“You might need to expand your imagination,” I suggested.Romney grew irritated. “Yeah, but I’ve got 25 grandkids!” he said, throwing up his hands. “How am I going to protect 25 grandkids, two great-grandkids? I’ve got five sons, five daughters-in-law—it’s like, we’re a big group.” This was clearly a problem to which he’d given serious thought, and realized there was no solution. In the weeks after January 6, he’d spent thousands of dollars a day to protect his family from red-capped vigilantes. But how do you hide a family of 40 from a president hell-bent on revenge?Recognizing that I’d hit a nerve, I said it was possible, of course, that Trump’s “retribution” rhetoric was all bluster. But Romney didn’t seem comforted.“I think he has shown by his prior actions that you can take him at his word,” he told me, his voice suddenly subdued. “So I would take him at his word.”Romney is the first to admit that retirement has never been his strong suit. The last time he attempted it, after losing the 2012 presidential election, the boredom nearly drove him crazy. Writing in his journal at the time, he struggled to even use the term retirement. “Terrifying word,” he wrote, “but worse reality.” Among those who know him best, the consensus is that he’ll need a post-Senate project—but what will it be?Romney told me he’s received invitations from multiple universities to teach, and was considering a campus lecture tour. He also remained fixated on finding ways to pull American politics back toward the center. He wanted to collect data on how reforming the primary system to allow ranked-choice voting and greater participation from independents might yield less extreme candidates. And he was eager to see more coordination among the various centrist nonprofits and third parties—No Labels, Forward, Unite America—that are devoted to depolarization.He conceded that there were hurdles impeding such efforts. Romney himself had been recruited by No Labels to run as an independent. Like everyone else approached by the group, Romney had turned them down. “The reality that anyone who looked at it had to confront was that you can’t win, right?” he told me. “And if you can’t win, you’re a spoiler, and you’re not quite sure who you’re going to spoil.” Sure, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. seemed content at the time to play the 2024 spoiler, but Romney didn’t exactly consider the anti-vaccine former Democrat a role model. The senator mentioned a recent New York Times article revealing that doctors had discovered a dead parasite in Kennedy’s brain in 2010. “I’m sorry, but there are certain people I will not vote for for president,” Romney told me. “People who’ve had a worm eat part of their brain should probably not be given the nuclear code.” (Kennedy dropped out over the summer and, perhaps confirming the wisdom of Romney’s litmus test, endorsed Trump.)There was, of course, one other possibility for Romney’s final act: a position in the next Biden administration. The two men have become unlikely friends in recent years. And according to one person close to the Biden campaign, senior Democrats in the president’s orbit had discussed appointing Romney to a high-profile diplomatic post in a second term, before Biden dropped out of the race. The conversations were hypothetical—ambassadorships aren’t typically doled out six months before an election—but such an offer would presumably be conditioned on an endorsement. And Romney wasn’t sure he could oblige.“Biden’s policies drive me crazy,” he told me. “And one of the reasons I think there are people like me who shrink at the idea of endorsing Biden is, does that mean I endorse his border policies? Or do I endorse giving trillions of dollars to college students to pay their debt?” He knew Trump’s authoritarianism and commitment to undermining America’s electoral system made him more dangerous than Biden. “The fact that if you want to be in the good graces of MAGA world you’ve got to say the election was stolen is extraordinary to me—but that is the test,” Romney said. Still, throwing his support behind a president whose policies he’d spent decades fighting against was a difficult thing to do. He told me he wasn’t ruling it out.In September, after Harris’s ascent to the top of the Democratic ticket, I asked Romney if he wanted to talk again, hoping to understand how the news might change his expectations for the election. He declined, but there are signs that his impression of the vice president, like that of many Americans, might be evolving. On the few occasions when he mentioned her in our interviews over the years, it was usually to describe the Democrats’ political bind. Romney had internalized the Washington consensus that, although Biden was clearly weak, Harris had no chance of beating Trump. But after her debate performance earlier this month, Romney seemed impressed. “Most people didn’t know her terribly well other than a few clips that were not flattering that you might see on the internet,” he told reporters. “And people saw, actually, she’s an intelligent, capable person.”As our conversation in the spring wound down, I decided to ask Romney a question I’d somehow neglected to bring up in our dozens of interviews before: What—if anything—gave him hope about the future?This question had come up repeatedly on my book tour. Invariably, after listening to me recount the sordid tales of cynicism, hypocrisy, and unbridled malice that Romney had witnessed inside Congress, someone in the audience would politely raise their hand and ask for a happy ending—and I’d draw a blank.When I put it to Romney in his office, he told me about a book he’d recently read, The Age of Acrimony. The book chronicled America from 1865 to 1915, a period in which the country was exploding with political energy, much of it destructive. Torch-carrying mobs held massive rallies that turned into riots. Political assassinations were widespread. Many people were predicting a second civil war. Then, in relatively short order, “the air went out of the balloon,” Romney told me. Presidential-election turnout rates plunged from 80 percent in 1896 (when many people were bribed for their vote) to less than 50 percent two decades later. Romney invited the author, a historian at the Smithsonian, to his office. He wanted to know what had changed. How had a nation addicted to partisan tribalism and political violence managed to break the cycle? The author told him that members of the generation that had come of age during this “age of acrimony” simply decided they didn’t want to live that way anymore.Romney thought about the young Americans who’d entered political consciousness during the Trump era. They’d watched their parents and grandparents fight endlessly with one another about politics on Facebook and fall down conspiracy-theory rabbit holes. They’d seen the caliber of politicians who rose to the top in this climate, and the havoc they’d wrought on democratic institutions. And he hoped that perhaps they were ready to try something different.When Romney announced his retirement last year, he framed the decision as a move to make room for “a new generation of leaders.” At the time, I didn’t pay much attention to this notion. It seemed like a savvy bit of rhetoric aimed as much at dinging the two geriatric presidential contenders at the time as it was at explaining his own thinking.But listening to him talk that day in his office, I was struck by just how much trust he was placing in younger Americans to fix Washington, if only because he’d lost confidence in the supposed adults running the town now.“I have hope in the rising generation,” Romney told me—hope “that they’re watching what’s going on, and they’re going to say, Enough.”This essay was adapted from the new afterword for the paperback edition of Romney: A Reckoning.
theatlantic.com
Israeli strikes kill 558 in Lebanon’s deadliest day of conflict since 2006 amid fears of all-out war
Israel says it has killed over 17,000 terrorists, without providing evidence.
nypost.com
Mikaela Mayer out for vengeance after ‘snakey’ trainer betrayed her for opponent
She called the switch a “blessing in disguise.” 
nypost.com
Killer mom Susan Smith will argue she should be paroled because she’s been (mostly) well behaved: ‘Just let me live my life’
Susan Smith, in prison for the cold-blooded 1994 murders of her two young sons, has a parole hearing in just six weeks including that she's been (mostly) well behaved in prison.
nypost.com
Jayden Daniels just announced himself to the NFL — and to Washington
Monday night’s Commanders victory in Cincinnati was stunning in its offensive efficiency and faith in rookie quarterback Jayden Daniels.
washingtonpost.com
10-year-old girl who got lost in woods while sleepwalking found safe by thermal-imaging drone: ‘Truly a miracle’
"It's truly a miracle that she was unharmed," Webster Parish Sheriff Jason Parker said.
nypost.com
Former FTX executive Caroline Ellison faces sentencing
Ellison, 29, pleaded guilty nearly two years ago and testified against Bankman-Fried for nearly three days at a trial last November.
nypost.com
Israel’s Strikes on Lebanon
We explore what led to the strikes, what’s happening now and what might come next.
nytimes.com
Hezbollah may have pushed Israel into a new war
As Israel launches a series of deadly strikes on Lebanon, Iran's most powerful proxy may be facing a real war.
nypost.com
Under a Texas sun, agrivoltaics offer farmers a new way to make money
The solar industry built expansive farms by leasing farmland and allowing sheep to graze on the same land. Clean energy now powers the grid, even in Texas.
washingtonpost.com
What the Yankees showed in the stretch run — and why it might not matter
When it comes to the playoffs, I am not sure what to make of how the season ends.
nypost.com
Everyone knows plastic pollution is bad. Why is it so hard for the world to act?
Plastic pollution has been growing exponentially, endangering the planet and human health. The UN is working on a treaty to reduce it. | M. Dylan/Europa Press via Getty Images Microplastics are everywhere: In our pantries and refrigerators, in our oceans, in the headlines. The world produces hundreds of millions of tons of plastic each year, much of which will eventually end up in landfills or the environment. It seems a month doesn’t go by without a new study affirming one of two things (or both): The tiny particles in the plastics we use every day have made their way into everything from our brains to men’s testicles. They could be contributing to the rise in cancer rates among young people that has befuddled scientists, and they may contribute to a higher risk of heart attack and stroke. The negative effects of plastic on the environment and on the health of life on Earth should worry everyone. At the same time, modern life depends on plastics, which are vital for everything from sterile single-use medical equipment to the modern transportation of goods around the globe. Durable and malleable, there are no real substitutes for plastics. So is there anything we can do about their ubiquity now? The world’s governments have agreed to give it a try. For the past couple years, the United Nations has been negotiating a plastics treaty — a binding agreement that could set firm limits on plastic production, establish commitments to reducing plastic pollution, and encourage new investments to improve our ability to recycle plastics.  The goal, in theory, is to reach an agreement by the end of the year. But there have been four negotiating sessions so far, with no final language yet agreed upon, and the last session is supposed to be held in late November, so there’s a real possibility that a deal won’t be reached. (If world leaders can’t even agree on a pandemic treaty in the immediate aftermath of a world-altering public health crisis, as the World Health Assembly failed to do this year, it would be unsurprising for them end up at an impasse over a slow-moving crisis like plastics pollution.) Scientists and advocacy groups fear that any final agreement could be a watered-down one, that objections from powerful industries will convince government leaders from wealthier countries to duck the commitments needed to reverse the plastic pollution crisis. The next few months will be pivotal as the world’s nations seek a consensus. “I am cautiously optimistic that we can come out of this with the treaty that will be meaningful and for me, that starts with reducing plastic production,” John Hocevar, director of Greenpeace’s oceans program, told me. “If we don’t start making less plastic, then we’re not going to make a dent.” The plastics crisis, explained Plastics are made of polymers, extremely long repetitive molecules that are naturally occurring in things like animal horns and rubber trees. Humanity has been making use of these materials for millennia. But the modern era of plastics began a little more than a century ago, when Leo Baekeland, a Belgian chemist who had migrated to the US, invented the first entirely synthetic plastic in 1907. The impressive heat resistance of plastic led to its wide adoption in the electrical equipment that was becoming more common at the time. The discovery of polymers in the 1920s and the industrial acceleration of World War II rapidly expanded humanity’s capacity to manufacture plastics.  In the second half of the 20th century, a worldwide explosion of petroleum production provided the raw materials for the mass manufacturing of plastics. Manufacturers turned to consumer applications for their products, such as clear packaging for foods, clothing, and lightweight suitcases. The types of plastics, too, have grown considerably since: Our flatscreen TVs and iPhones and smart watches all depend on the latest iterations. Read more from Vox on plastic pollution Finally, a solution to plastic pollution that’s not just recycling The massive, unregulated source of plastic pollution you’ve probably never heard of More than ever, our clothes are made of plastic. Just washing them can pollute the oceans. Why 99% of ocean plastic pollution is “missing” Plastics now are no longer seen as a scientific marvel, but rather as an inextricable part of everyday life. It is cheaper to produce than other materials, leading to the proliferation of single-use plastic items, from the vital (packaging for vaccine syringes) to the frivolous (grocery bags). It’s estimated there was more plastic produced in the first decade of the 21st century than in the entirety of the 20th. In 1950, humanity produced 2 million metric tons of plastic. Today, we are churning out 430 million metric tons of plastics every year, two-thirds of which is for only short-term use and quickly ends up in a landfill. In 2009, scientists at the research group RTI International and the trade association PlasticsEurope predicted: “Any future scenario where plastics do not play an increasingly important role in human life … seems unrealistic.” Since the 1970s, some scientists and environmental advocates have warned that our plastic usage was unsustainable, harmful, and could deepen our dependence on fossil fuels. The birth of the environmental movement gave rise to concerns with plastic pollution, particularly its impacts on natural habitats, including the world’s oceans, and the dependence on petrochemicals required to produce it. You may have read about the Great Pacific Garbage Patch — an accumulation of human waste more than twice the size of Texas, 99 percent of which is plastic. Thus far, the benefits have appeared to outweigh their environmental risks to industry and policymakers.  But more recently, we’ve been learning that the reach of plastics is much more pervasive than we previously thought. The tiny molecules that make up plastics, it turns out, can flake off and find their way into almost every part of the human body. Washing our plastic-laced clothing in hot water can ultimately lead to microplastics leaking out into the ocean, into the seafood that we eat, and back into our bodies.  It’s a feedback loop with dire consequences, based on emerging evidence: Microplastics may be associated with higher risk of dementia, heart disease, infertility, and more. And we haven’t figured out how to avoid ingesting them.  One study published earlier this year found microplastic pollution in every one of the two dozen human testicles and nearly 50 dog testicles that were sampled. Another group of researchers found that the increasing prevalence of microplastics parallels the alarming recent rise in early onset cancers. We already have research suggesting that some of the compounds in microplastics could contribute to cancer development. The disproportionately low-income communities where plastics are produced may be especially at risk. Shiv Srivastava is the policy director for Fenceline Watch, a local environmental group in Houston, where a significant share of US oil is produced. He told me that because the city lacks zoning restrictions, residential developments are built next to those industrial sites. “Our communities are negatively impacted directly from the toxic multigenerational harm of plastic production,” he said. Accidents are a common occurrence at oil refineries and other industrial plants, posing an acute risk to nearby residents, and there is also evidence of elevated cancer rates that could be linked to longer-term exposure to fossil fuel production. On the other end of the plastic life cycle, plastic waste sometimes ends up being exported to the Global South, making rich countries’ trash an often hazardous problem for poor nations.  The world is working on a plastics treaty And yet, unless something changes, global plastic production is projected to triple from current levels by 2060. By 2050, greenhouse gas output associated with plastic production, use, and disposal will account for 15 percent of all the world’s emissions. When Hocevar, Greenpeace’s oceans program director, started at the organization 20 years ago, he told me, most people did not consider plastics to be a major threat to human health. “But pretty quickly, we realize that this isn’t just an ocean problem,” Hocevar said. “It’s a climate issue. It’s a human health issue. It’s an environmental justice issue.” With the emerging evidence painting an increasingly clear picture of the danger plastics present to humanity, the United Nations Environment Assembly, made up of representatives from 193 countries, in 2022 decided to negotiate a legally binding agreement to end plastic pollution. They set a deadline for themselves: the end of 2024. The questions under consideration have been clear from the start: Should plastic production be reduced? Should certain plastics be banned or phased out? What investments can be made to reduce the plastic pollution that already exists, particularly in precious natural habitats?  But the negotiators have not reached a final decision on any of the proposal treaty sections, instead continuing to deliberate over a range of options for draft language. There have been four formal negotiating conferences so far, with informal, behind-closed-doors talks in between. The final conference is scheduled for November in Busan, South Korea. The process started with great optimism, based on contemporaneous notes taken by the Plastic Pollution Coalition, one of the large nonprofit groups involved in and closely monitoring the treaty talks. Every country, from large industrialized nations like the United States to the small island nations most directly affected by plastic dumped into the oceans, agreed on the need for such an agreement. But it quickly became clear there were sharp divisions that could prevent a substantive agreement from being reached. At that first meeting in December 2022, major manufacturing countries (like China and India) and oil producers (Saudi Arabia and Iran), which supply the raw materials for plastic production, argued the treaty should require only that each nation create their own national action plans for plastic waste — not plastic production — which would include non-binding targets for reducing pollution. On the other end of the spectrum, some more progressive developed countries, led by Norway, allied with African countries, led by Rwanda, argued for a global approach that limits plastic production and bans the use of certain compounds (like PFAS, also known as “forever chemicals”). Groups like Greenpeace have been advocating for a 75 percent reduction in plastic production. The US has said it supports a goal of zero plastic pollution in the environment by 2040 — though it hasn’t yet committed to the specific plan to realize that goal. There are serious doubts over whether these two camps — known as the “high-ambition” and “low-ambition” coalitions among insiders — can find consensus before the end of the year, although everyone I spoke to expressed reserved optimism about a final deal. The US government, for its part, has tried to play dealmaker, according to people close to the process. At times the US has appeared allied with China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. But it is also trying to keep an open dialogue with advocacy groups and the more ambitious set of nations, Margaret Spring, chief conservation and science officer at the Monterey Bay Aquarium, told me. “The United States has been playing kind of a dealmaker. They didn’t want to get trapped in a coalition,” Spring, who held senior positions at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration during the Obama presidency and has represented the International Science Council at the negotiations, told me. The question looming over the next several months: Is there really a deal to be made? The most important dividing line in the plastic treaty talks More than any other issue, specific limits on plastic production are the most contentious. Scientists and advocates argue they are necessary, that a successful treaty must address the full life cycle of plastics from birth to disposal. But, as the fight against climate change has affirmed again and again, overcoming the influence of the oil and gas industries is extremely difficult. Nearly 200 lobbyists from those industries attended the fourth negotiating conference in Ottawa this past May. They significantly outnumbered representatives from the scientific and Indigenous communities, making the argument that a treaty should focus on demand, rather than on supply, and on recycling. The problem, scientists and advocates say, is that recycling plastics is notoriously difficult and can lead to its own health hazards. This week, California sued ExxonMobil for allegedly lying about the effectiveness of plastic recycling. At the May meeting, the majority of the conference agreed to exclude “upstream” measures — i.e., those focused on supply and production — from any of the agreement draft language. While there is still an opportunity to insert such provisions into the final draft, it represented a setback for the environmental advocates. “It’s like trying to regulate tobacco and we know it causes cancer. But then you’re bringing in all these executives to create regulations on the deadly product. Essentially the same thing here,” Erica Cirino, author of Thicker Than Water: The Quest for Solutions to the Plastic Crisis, now working at the Plastic Pollution Coalition, told me. There have been some signs of the impasse thawing. In August, a group of environmental activists attended a meeting with US government officials, in which they were told that the Biden administration would support limits to plastic production; Reuters soon reported the same, citing a source close to US negotiators.  “They don’t know how they’re gonna do the supply side, but they’re willing to say that that has to happen,” Spring said. “You can’t recycle your way out of it.” But since that development in August, there has not been a more forceful public declaration of that new position from the US government — to the discouragement of some advocates. “Right now, while we applaud what this shift could potentially mean, without meaningful details, it’s only as valuable as a piece of paper it’s written on,” Srivastava told me. “Right now, there isn’t one.” Some of the people closely monitoring the treaty talks chalk up America’s caginess to its dealmaker role, avoiding a public position to keep more resistant countries at the table. The risks of failure Beyond plastics production levels, there are still plenty of other details to work out. Should certain substances be banned or phased out? Should companies be required to disclose the chemicals in their plastics? Should countries that refuse to ratify the treaty be subjected to punitive trade measures? All of those questions are supposed to be addressed during ongoing “intersessional” negotiations that are not made public, and then at the final November conference. Some of those monitoring the process say they would not be surprised if an additional conference is scheduled to hash out a final deal, which advocates say would be preferable to a weak agreement that lacks the mechanisms to expand in the future.  Others, however, worry that the final product could only be more watered down the longer negotiations go on. As both sides look for an exit strategy, the low-ambition countries could gain more leverage to insist, for example, on nixing any firm production limits on plastics. “When you have momentum, you use the momentum. Keep going,” Spring said. “I think that the danger of extending is: Does the air go out of the balloon?” Advocates are urging policymakers to seize the moment. “Every minute that we don’t have this treaty is more time where plastic pollution is accumulating,” Srivastava continued. “It is only going to increase without mandated reduction targets worldwide. So it’s super important that it happens.”
vox.com
Have economists gone out of fashion in Washington?
Once the high priests of policy, economists may now be seeing lower demand. But who's taking their place?
npr.org
Trump Withdraws Support, GOP Pulls Funding from ‘Black Nazi’ Mark Robinson
Andrew Harnik/Getty ImagesDonald Trump and the Republican Party are ditching Mark Robinson, their scandal-plagued nominee in the North Carolina governor’s race.Robinson has been battling to keep his head above water after claims that he called himself a “Black Nazi” and made other offensive comments on a pornographic website.But it appears the national GOP hierarchy are prepared to let him drown. The Republican Governors Association said in a statement that they are pulling Robinson’s financial support.Read more at The Daily Beast.
thedailybeast.com