3 theories for how Donald Trump made the GOP less white
Is Donald Trump on track to win a historic share of voters of color in November’s presidential election?
On the surface, it’s one of the most confounding questions of the Trump years in American politics. Trump — and the Republican Party in his thrall — has embraced anti-immigrant policies and proposals, peddled racist stereotypes, and demonized immigrants. So why does it look like he might win over and hold the support of greater numbers of nonwhite voters than the Republican Party of years past?
In poll after poll, he’s hitting or exceeding the levels of support he received in 2020 from Latino and Hispanic voters. He’s primed to make inroads among Asian American voters, whose Democratic loyalty has gradually been declining over the last few election cycles. And the numbers he’s posting with Black voters suggest the largest racial realignment in an election since the signing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
There are a plethora of explanations for this shift, but first, some points of clarification. The pro-Trump shift is concentrated among Hispanic and Latino voters, though it has appeared to be spreading to parts of the Black and Asian American electorate.
Second, things have changed since Vice President Kamala Harris took over the Democratic ticket in late July. Polling confirms that Harris has posted significant improvements among nonwhite voters, young voters, Democrats, and suburban voters. In other words, Harris has managed to revive the party’s standing with its base, suggesting that a part of Trump’s gains were due to unique problems that Biden had with these groups of voters. Thus, it’s not entirely clear to what extent this great racial realignment, as some have described the Trump-era phenomenon, will manifest itself in November.
Still, Democrats aren’t in the clear. That same polling suggests that, despite Harris’s improvements, she is still underperforming both Biden’s support at this point in the 2020 polls and the margins of victory Biden ended up winning on Election Day. These numbers, especially the results among Latino and Hispanic voters, should be worrisome to Democrats: Biden did rather poorly among Latino voters relative to other candidates from the current century, resulting in Trump posting numbers not seen by a Republican since George W. Bush ran for reelection in 2004, and Harris could perform even more poorly.
Why? Putting aside environmental factors and shifts in the American electorate that are happening independent of the candidates, there are a few theories to explain how Trump has uniquely weakened political polarization along the lines of race and ethnicity.
1) Trump has successfully associated himself with a message of economic nostalgia, heightening nonwhite Americans’ memories of the pre-Covid economy in contrast to the period of inflation we’re now exiting.
2) Trump and his campaign have also zeroed in specifically on outreach and messaging to nonwhite men as part of their larger focus on appealing to male voters.
3) Trump and his party have taken advantage of a confluence of social factors, including messaging on immigration and cultural issues, to shore up support from conservative voters of color who have traditionally voted for Democrats or not voted at all.
Theory 1: Effective campaigning on the economy
Trump’s loudest message — the one that gets the most headlines — is his bombastic attacks on immigrants and his pledge to conduct mass deportations. His most successful appeal to voters, though, which he has held on to despite an improving economy under Biden, is economic. Trump claims to have presided over a time of broad and magnificent prosperity, arguing that there was a Trump economic renaissance before Biden bungled it.
That pitch doesn’t comport with reality, but it may be resonating with voters who disproportionately prioritize economic concerns in casting their votes, particularly Latino and Asian American voters.
Polling suggests that voters at large remember the Trump-era economy fondly and view Trump’s policies more favorably than Biden’s. Black and Latino voters in particular may have more negative memories about Biden and Democrats’ economic stewardship because they experienced worse rates of inflation than white Americans and Asian Americans did during 2021 and 2022.
Those memories came up constantly on a recent Black Voters for Trump voter outreach swing this September through predominantly Black neighborhoods in Philadelphia.
“We have got to get somebody in the White House that has been there, knows our economy, knows what a bad economy looks like, and will get us where we need to go,” Signa Griffin, who described herself as a Black Trump supporter living in Philadelphia, told me.
Sharita White, another Black voter planning to support Trump, said not enough people want to admit how much better life was when Trump was president. “They talk so bad about him, but they forgot what happened,” she said. “I don’t know too much about politics, but the only thing I know, my income changed, and if I need that man to get in here to fix my income, I’m all down.”
Polling suggests Hispanic and Asian American voters are feeling economic concerns especially keenly, and Hispanic voters in particular seem primed for an economic pitch from Trump: More than half said they trusted Trump over Biden to “make good decisions about economic policy,” according to research conducted by the Pew Research Center this summer. It was the topic on which Trump had the biggest advantage.
Of course, Trump has long inflated his economic record and conveniently ignores the economic devastation he presided over during the Covid-19 pandemic and recession. That deflection provides an additional point that further complicates the blame Biden has received on the economy. Presidents, in general, have limited ability to control the economy (or inflation), given the independence of the Federal Reserve and how interconnected our economy is with the world at large. But sour perceptions still helped drag down Biden’s approval rating and electoral support as a candidate.
And it hasn’t stopped Trump from making a big deal about the opportunities his administration secured for minority-owned small businesses — he talks about cutting regulations, providing emergency assistance during the pandemic, and keeping unemployment low.
All of this resonates with Hispanic and Asian American communities, James Zarsadiaz, a professor of history and researcher on conservatism at the University of San Francisco, told me. “As [these entrepreneurs] feel the punch of inflation, fees, taxes to run a business in very expensive metro areas, the GOP is starting to look more attractive to them again because they’re seen as the party on the side of the small-business owner, as opposed to the Democrats who are seen as the party of protecting workers.”
Once again, things have changed since Harris became the nominee, and polls specifically focusing on economic sentiment have tracked an improving national mood and growing trust in Harris’s ability to handle economic issues. But Trump is still benefiting from a sense of nostalgia and has tried his best to tie Harris to Biden’s economic record, asking voters routinely if they are better off today than they were four years ago.
Theory 2: Direct appeals to nonwhite men
The political realignment of women voters has been one of the major stories of 2024; the gender gap in American politics exploded in 2016, took a break in 2020, and seems like it’s about to be historic in 2024, with a huge pro-Democrat shift among women. At the same time, though, the rightward drift of men, including men of color, is a quiet undercurrent that may end up explaining what happened if Trump wins in November.
Plenty of theories have been raised in the past about what kind of appeal Trump might have specifically to men and to men of color: Does his businessman persona resonate with upwardly mobile, financially aspirational men? Is there a “macho” appeal there for Hispanic men? Could his gritty, outsider, everyman posturing and brash rhetoric resonate with Black and Latino men, particularly those living in traditionally Democratic cities?
All of those could play a factor, but more significantly, pre-Harris, Trump’s campaign and allies doubled down on reaching out to men, especially men of color, as part of an effort to exploit the growing gender gap and fuel disillusionment with Democrats.
It’s the “Jamal and Enrique” strategy that the Trump campaign appears to believe in, that “for every Karen we lose, we’re going to win a Jamal and an Enrique,” as Trump allies explained it to the Atlantic’s Tim Alberta in July. That includes speaking to, campaigning with, and getting endorsements from TikTok stars, sports personalities, and popular Black and Latin musicians who have large young male audiences.
Intentionally or otherwise, this strategy could exacerbate movement by traditionally Democratic constituencies that were already slipping. Among young Black, Asian American, and Latino men, loyalty to the Democratic Party has faded. Younger Latinos in general are more likely than older Latinos to identify as independents, and younger Latino men have tended to support Republican candidates at higher rates than young Latinas. An example: A Brookings analysis of the 2022 midterms found Latinos under the age of 30 “supported Republican candidates for Congress (40%) at nearly double the rate of young Latinas (21%).” And Pew Research has routinely found that younger Black men are more likely to identify as Republicans than older Black men.
Theory 3: Championing conservative social issues
Trump and the GOP may also have found the right social issues to emphasize and campaign on in order to exploit some of the cultural divides between conservative and moderate nonwhite voters, and liberal white voters who also make up part of the Democratic base (in addition to liberal nonwhite voters). In 2021 and 2022, that looked like fearmongering on gender identity and crime, playing up concerns over affirmative action, and campaigning on the overturning of Roe v Wade.
In 2023 and 2024, the Trump focus has shifted strongly toward immigration, an issue that has divided the Democratic coalition as hostility toward immigration has grown. That’s true even for Latino and Hispanic voters — long seen as being the voting group most amenable to a pro-immigrant, Democratic message — and it’s being used as a wedge issue by Republicans among Black voters as well.
Though it was seen as a gaffe, Trump’s “black jobs” comment during the first presidential debate got to this tension — the idea of migrants taking jobs, resources, and opportunities from non-white citizens. Florida Republican Rep. Byron Donalds, one of Trump’s go-to Black surrogates, explained the argument to me like this: “If you’re a Black man, Hispanic man, white man, you’re working hard every day, and the money you earn doesn’t go as far. That hurts your family, that hurts your kids. So they look at this situation, this immigration problem. People are saying, ‘Wait a minute. Why are illegal aliens getting food, getting shelter, getting an education, while my family and my child is struggling. It’s not right, and it’s not fair.’”
And for Asian American voters, now the fastest growing ethnic segment of the electorate, immigration is also becoming a wedge issue, Zarsadiaz told me.
“This feeling, ‘I’ve waited my turn, I waited my time’ — there’s long been Latino and Asian American immigrants who have felt this way. The assumption has long been that if you’re an immigrant, you must be very liberal on immigration, and that’s definitely not the case,” Zarsadiaz said. “Some of the staunchest critics of immigration, especially on amnesty or Dreamers, are immigrants themselves, and with Asian Americans that’s an issue that has been drawing more voters to Trump and Trumpism — those immigrant voters who feel like they’re being wronged.”
Democrats are now moderating on immigration, but only after years of moving left. And that shift left has been true on a range of issues, contributing to another part of this theory of Trump’s gains: that Democrats have pushed conservative or moderate nonwhite Americans away as they embraced beliefs more popular with white, college-educated, and suburban voters. The political scientist Ruy Teixeira and Republican pollster Patrick Ruffini have been theorizing for a while now that a disjuncture over social issues in general — and Trump’s seizure of these issues — has complicated the idea that Democrats would benefit from greater numbers and rates of participation from nonwhite America. It may explain why conservative and moderate voters of color, who may have voted for Democrats in the past, are now realigning with the Republican Party.
Don’t forget the non-Trump factors
These three theories try to describe how Trump specifically has been able to improve his and the GOP’s standing among a growing segment of the American electorate. They place Trump as the central cause for the majority of this racial political shift. But would these dynamics still be happening if he weren’t involved?
There are signs that some of this shift may be happening independently of Trump. It could be a product of the growing diversification of America, upward mobility and changing understandings of class, and growing educational divides.
For example, as rates of immigration change and the share of US-born Latino and Asian Americans grows, their partisan loyalties may continue to change. Those born closer to the immigrant experience may have had more of a willingness to back the party seen as more welcoming of immigrants, but as generations get further away from that experience, racial and ethnic identity may become less of a factor in the development of political thinking.
Concepts of racial identity and memory are also changing — younger Black Americans, for example, have less of a tie to the Civil Rights era — potentially contributing to less strong political polarization among Black and Latino people in the US independently of any given candidate — and creating more persuadable voters in future elections.
At the same time, younger generations are increasingly identifying as independents or outside of the two-party paradigm — a change in loyalty that stands to hurt Democrats first, since Democrats tend to do better with younger voters.
Regardless of whether Trump just happens to be the right kind of populist at the right time of racial and ethnic change in America or if he’s a unique accelerator and contributor to the changes America is experiencing, November may offer more evidence that something has fundamentally changed in US politics. As America diversifies, it makes sense for its political parties to diversify too — and that poses a reckoning for Democrats in elections to come.